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Abstract
Does supplementary private health insurance coverage inuence health care uti-
lization in countries where the coverage ratio with public health insurance is high?
I estimate this e¤ect using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe.
Handling the potential endogeneity of supplementary insurance coverage and the large
fraction of zero observations in the utilization models inuences the empirical results.
I show that the e¤ect of private health insurance coverage on inpatient and outpatient
care utilization is not trivial even in countries with generous public health funding. The
main nding is that supplementary private health insurance coverage increases dental
care utilization, but decreases the visits to general practitioners. Private insurance is
estimated to have little and insignicant inuence on the utilization of inpatient care
and outpatient specialist care. The magnitude of the e¤ect of supplementary private
health insurance on health care utilization varies with the characteristics of the health
1
care systems.
1 Introduction
In most of the European countries there is almost universal coverage with public health
insurance, and more than 50% of health expenditures are nanced by the general govern-
ment. Given this institutional background does supplementary private health insurance
(PHI) coverage inuence health care utilization? I focus on the utilization of hospital, gen-
eral practitioner (GP), specialist, and dental care among people aged 50 and over. Due to
the age restriction the sample used is not representative for the whole population of the
analyzed countries. However, health care utilization increases on average with age, therefore
the results can be indicative for the overall health care systems.
Despite the broad coverage with public insurance, the coverage rate with supplementary
PHI is still not negligible in the countries analyzed. In this paper I estimate the e¤ect of PHI
on health care utilization, and also analyze how these e¤ects vary with some institutional
characteristics of the countries.
A seminal empirical paper analyzing the e¤ect of health insurance on the demand for
medical care is of Manning et al. (1987). Based on the RAND health insurance experiment
conducted in the U.S., they show that more generous health insurance plans increase the
demand for outpatient services. Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998) also nd positive e¤ect of
health insurance coverage on health care utilization probability, using the National Medical
Expenditure Survey from the United States. In Europe mandatory health insurance is more
widespread, therefore private health insurance might have smaller role in inuencing health
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care utilization.
Two closely related papers which use European data are of Jones et al. (2006) and
Paccagnella et al. (2012). Jones et al. (2006) nd a positive e¤ect of supplementary health
insurance coverage on the probability of visiting a specialist. Their results are based on
samples of four countries from the European Community Household Panel User Data-
base (ECHP-UDB). My research di¤ers from theirs not only in the wider country cov-
erage of the sample used, but also in the di¤erent methodology and extended research
question - I analyze the e¤ect of PHI on hospital, GP and dental care utilization, as well.
Paccagnella et al. (2012) give a detailed analysis of the determinants of voluntary PHI cov-
erage in Europe, based on the rst wave of the SHARE database.1 They also analyze the
e¤ect of voluntary PHI on out-of-pocket expenditures, and nd that this e¤ect varies across
countries. The demand for voluntary PHI, and its e¤ect on medical expenditures based on
the SHARE data are analyzed also by Holly et al. (2005). They nd some evidence that
voluntary PHI coverage may have a positive e¤ect on out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
This paper contributes to the literature in providing an international comparison about
the utilization enhancing e¤ect of supplementary PHI. An additional novelty is to analyze
the e¤ect of supplementary PHI coverage if health care utilization is modelled as two-stage
decision, and the endogeneity of PHI is taken into account. I identify the e¤ect of PHI by
using the assumption that only current employment characteristics inuence the utilization,
whereas past employment characteristics inuence PHI coverage.
Section 2 provides an overview of the health care institutions and the role of private
1Details about the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) are provided in Section
5.
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health insurance in the analyzed countries. The economic considerations underlying the
empirical analysis are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical model, and
the dataset used is described in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the empirical results, and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional background
I investigate the e¤ect of supplementary PHI on health care utilization in eleven European
countries. There are considerable di¤erences across the health care institutions. Some of
these di¤erences are related to health care nancing and health care resources. The institu-
tional background inuences the role PHI has. The demand for PHI, and its e¤ect on health
care utilization depend among others on the out-of-pocket cost of medical services. If the
services are covered by the mandatory public insurance then the out-of-pocket costs cannot
be further reduced by the supplementary PHI.
In this section I provide some details on the health care systems in the analyzed countries.
I focus on those characteristics which might indicate the role PHI has in nancing health care.
In Table 1 I present a selection of indicators related to the health care institutions. Except
for the data presented in the rst column, all indicators are based on aggregate statistics
provided by the World Health Organization (WHO).2 In the third column the values are
purchasing power parity (ppp) adjusted. I give a detailed explanation in Section 5 how the
PHI indicator of the rst column was generated.
2The WHO data are based on the WHO European health for all (HFA) database. In the WHO statistics
the public health expenditure measure for Switzerland includes the expenditures covered by mandatory
private health insurance.
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The correlation coe¢ cient of PHI coverage rate with the ratio of health expenditures
covered by public sources is close to zero. On the other hand, PHI coverage is more prevalent
among people aged 50 or over in those countries where the public health expenditure per
inhabitant or relative to GDP is higher. An explanation for these positive relations can be
that more developed and widespread health care resources imply higher costs of health care,
which can increase not only the public health expenditures, but also the demand for PHI
coverage.
Table 1: Heath insurance and health expenditure indicators, 2004
PHI coverage Public per Public health Public health
ratio (%) total health expenditures per expenditures
in the sample expenditures (%) inhabitant ($ ppp) per GDP (%)
AT 23.3 75.7 2,568 7.8
BE 76.1 72.9 2,172 7.0
DK 36.3 83.8 2,531 7.8
FR 84.2 79.3 2,550 8.7
DE 21.6 77.0 2,435 8.1
GR 5.2 59.1 1,189 4.3
IT 5.6 76.0 1,823 6.6
NL 81.9 64.4 1,936 5.8
ES 9.2 70.5 1,487 5.7
SE 9.1 81.8 2,425 7.6
CH 32.7 58.4 2,334 6.7
Source SHARE WHO WHO WHO
The following characteristics of the health care systems refer to year 2004, when the survey
data I use were collected, and are based on OECD (2004), Paccagnella et al. (2012), and
Thomson et al. (2009). Except for Switzerland, all the analyzed countries have mandatory
public health insurance. In Switzerland there is mandatory insurance, but that is provided by
private insurance companies. The coverage with the mandatory insurance is almost universal
in all countries except for Germany and Netherlands. In Germany the civil servants, high
earners, and self employed are exempt, whereas in the Netherlands the high earners are
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exempt (prior to 2006).
Although there is almost universal coverage with the mandatory (public) health insur-
ance, some cost sharing arrangements still apply in all countries. These arrangements vary
across the countries. It varies to which services and to whom does the cost sharing apply,
and also its magnitude di¤ers across the countries. For example, in Austria and Sweden it
applies to most services, whereas in Spain there is no cost sharing for GP or specialist care.
In some countries, as in Austria, Belgium, and Italy, those with low income or with chronic
health problems are exempt from the cost sharing.
PHI can be the primary health insurance for those not covered by public insurance.
Otherwise, PHI can have supplementary or complementary role. Supplementary PHI covers
services not insured by the public insurance. This is the most prevalent role of PHI in Europe.
Complementary PHI can be contracted to cover cost sharing for services not fully nanced
by the public insurance. This is widespread in France, where the complementary PHI is even
provided free of charge for those with low income. In the following I call "supplementary
private health insurance" all those PHI contracts which do not have primary function.
3 Economic considerations
In this section I provide some theoretical motivation to the empirical analysis. Health insur-
ance coverage can decrease the observed costs of health services or can make higher quality
of services available, both of which increase the demand for medical care.
An important assumption throughout this paper is that PHI coverage is predetermined.
The main reason for this assumption is that individuals above a given age are generally
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excluded from contracting PHI (see Mossialos and Thomson (2004)). The decision about
buying PHI is likely to be made before age 50, during the earlier working life. This decision
can be inuenced by the insurance costs and availability, and by the potential benets of such
a contract, which depend on risk-aversion, risk of future health problems and potential health
care expenditures. Although PHI is considered as predetermined, some of the inuencing
factors of coverage are time-invariant, like gender, education, cohort-e¤ects, or the main
features of the health care system, at least in the short to middle run. Thus, it is possible
to estimate the e¤ect of such time-invariant factors on the likelihood of PHI coverage.
I assume that individuals maximize a deterministic utility function, which depends on
consumption and health. Future health is inuenced by the utilization of health care. De-
cision about making an initial contact with a physician or going to hospital is made by the
individual. I also assume that the frequency of doctoral visits afterwards, and the length of
hospital stay are at least partially decided by the patients.
Expenditure on consumption goods and on medical services are limited by income and
wealth. The cost of medical services depends on several factors: on the type or quality of
the service, whether the individual has PHI, and on the country-specic features of health
care. In the empirical analysis I control for the country-specic e¤ects by including country
dummies in the utilization models, and allowing country-specic e¤ect of some observables.
Assuming positive but diminishing marginal utility of consumption and health, and pos-
itive but diminishing marginal product of medical care on health, the demand for health
care services decreases with the realized price and increases with the service quality. Thus,
according to a simple health care demand model, PHI coverage is expected to increase the
demand for health services. This e¤ect can be due to moral hazard or to the access to ser-
7
vices unavailable without PHI coverage.3 However, if health care prices are generally low,
and utilization is primarily determined by health problems then insurance coverage might
have moderate e¤ect on utilization. The empirical results of this paper a¢ rm the positive
e¤ect of supplementary PHI on health care utilization only partially.
4 Empirical model
4.1 Empirical issues of health care demand estimation
Following the model of Grossman (1972), most empirical health care models include a rich
set of regressors to capture health, and health production characteristics. Such empirical
models of health care demand are applied among others by Hunt-McCool et al. (1994) and
Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998). This strand of the literature follows the consumer theory
approach.
A detailed discussion about the econometric issues of estimating medical care usage mod-
els is given by Jones (2000). Basic issues are that the dependent variable is not continuous,
there is a large number of zero observations, which can be modelled with one-step or two-step
models, and there are usually measurement problems as well.
Time-invariant but unobserved taste shifters might be correlated both with supplemen-
tary PHI coverage and health care utilization. It can be due to adverse selection and to
positive selection, as well. First, the problem of adverse selection arises if those people are
more likely to be covered with PHI who are also more likely to utilize health care due to
3Jones et al. (2006) di¤erentiate four inuencing mechanisms of health insurance on utilization: 1. moral
hazard e¤ect due to reduced prices, 2. risk reduction e¤ect due to reduced nancial uncertainty, 3. income
transfer e¤ect (ex post transfer from the healthy to the ill), and 4. access e¤ect due to the access to high
quality services.
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unobserved health problems or due to less subjective disutility attached to medical care.
Second, there is positive selection if PHI is more likely to be purchased by wealthier indi-
viduals who are at the same time in better health condition, thus have lower demand for
health care. Although I control for income and wealth in the empirical models, these controls
cannot perfectly capture the economic situation of the respondents.
I estimate the insurance coverage and utilization models on a pooled sample of the an-
alyzed countries. Bago dUva and Jones (2009) reject the equality of income and education
e¤ects on health care utilization across European countries. However, some assumption of
equality is needed in order to avoid the problem of small country-specic samples. Apart
from including country dummies in the empirical models, I allow the e¤ect of income and
wealth on utilization to be country-specic. The out-of-pocket costs of health care services
vary across countries, these di¤erences imply varying e¤ect of income and wealth on utiliza-
tion. The liquidity of certain wealth components, thus their e¤ect on health care utilization
might also vary across countries. The e¤ect of supplementary PHI on health care utilization
is also allowed to be country specic.
4.2 Two-part specication
In the preferred specication the underlying assumption is that separate processes drive the
probability of making any doctoral visits, and the number of visits (similarly for hospital
stays). The statistical reason for applying two-stage modelling is the relatively large number
of observed zero outcomes.4
4Two-stage modelling is a standard approach in modelling health care demand, see e.g.
Zimmerman Murphy (1987), Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), and Werblow et al. (2007).
An alternative modelling strategy could be the application of nite mixture (latent class) models, as e.g.
Deb and Trivedi (1997). Such models allow for heterogeneity in the population, but do not apply strict
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Following the argument of Dow and Norton (2003), if zero values are "true zeros", i.e.
the results of corner solution and not of sample selection then applying sample selection
estimation methods can be misleading, whereas two-part models can be appropriate. In
addition, Norton et al. (2008) analyze the properties of sample selection and two-part models
if there is a large fraction of zero observations and there are no exclusion restrictions. They
show that two-part models can be superior even if the errors in the two parts of the models
are correlated. In the health care utilization models of this paper there are no clear exclusion
restrictions: the same observed characteristics drive the probability of health care utilization
and the amount of utilization. This modelling feature calls for the application of two-part
models, instead of selection models.
The two-part model is based on the assumption that the second stage error term has zero
expected value, conditional on positive outcome and on the exogenous regressors. Based on
this assumption the two parts of the model can be estimated separately. The rst part is
about the probability of health care utilization, and the second part is about the amount of
utilization. The simple two-part model has to be modied due to the potential endogeneity
of PHI in the utilization models.
The equations of the rst part model the supplementary PHI coverage together with the
probability of having any GP visits, specialist visits or hospital stays (Pos_Yj). This part
of the model can also be estimated for dental care, for which only a binary indicator of
separation between those who utilize and do not utilize health care services. Then the marginal e¤ects are
allowed to vary among "latent classes" of the population. I apply the simpler two-part modelling approach,
but extend that with handling the endogeneity of PHI coverage.
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utilization is available.
PHIi = Zi + i
PHIi = 1(PHI

i > 0) (1)
Pos_Y ji = Xi1j + 1jPHIi + "1ji
Pos_Yji = 1(Pos_Y ji > 0): (2)
Index i refers to the individual, and index j di¤erentiates the parameters and variables
according to the dependent variable: The dependent variable Y is either the number of
doctoral visits (GP or specialist visits) or hospital nights. PHI indicates the coverage with
supplementary private health insurance, and X is a vector of variables including a rich set
of socioeconomic indicators. In particular, X includes age, gender, marital status, dummy
variable for having children, logarithmic income, logarithmic value of the main residence
(replaced with zero if the reported value of the main residence is zero), education (four
categories: International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED) codes 0-1, 2, 3-4
and 5-6), employment status, indicators of the current employment as civil servant, public
sector employee or self employed, rm size at current employment, living area and smoking
dummies, country dummies, and three health measures. In the outpatient care utilization
models the education level and the number of health problems of the partner are also included
as regressors. These can serve as proxies for the partners health care utilization, which might
induce utilization by the respondent. The e¤ects of income, wealth, and supplementary PHI
coverage are allowed to be country-specic. Further details about the data are given in
Section 5.
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The variables in vector Z which can also inuence health care utilization are the following:
age, gender, marital status, having children, wealth and income measures, education level,
living area, and country dummies. Since PHI is treated as predetermined, I exclude those
indicators that are likely to have changed since contracting the insurance (smoking indicators,
health measures). Model (1) is a reduced formmodel of insurance coverage in which potential
interactions between health and PHI coverage are not modelled. In this specication I include
such control variables that can capture the socioeconomic circumstances when the decision
on PHI coverage was made, keeping in mind that this decision was made earlier.
The identifying instruments of supplementary PHI are indicators of the last employment:
the number of people employed at the last job (rm size), and whether the respondent was
public employee, civil servant or self-employed at the last job. The rm size indicator is
based on the number of employees at the current or last job. I di¤erentiate six categories
ranging from 1 to 500 plus employees, and an additional category holds if the respondent
is self-employed or the question is not applicable (25% of the respondent). Occupational
status inuences PHI coverage, as it is possible that the insurance is contracted through or
supported by the employer, and in some countries di¤erent insurance regulations hold for the
self-employed or civil servants. Paccagnella et al. (2012) document that in most countries
covered by SHARE, supplementary PHI coverage is predominant among employees of rms
with more than 24 employees. Mossialos and Thomson (2004) also report that group policies,
i.e. supplementary PHI purchased by groups (typically by employers) have a major role in
many European countries. Group policies generally o¤er lower prices and more favorable
conditions, and are often provided as an employee benet. The availability of group policies
varies with rm size.
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The identication is based on the assumption that only the current characteristics of
the employment inuence health care utilization decisions, whereas the rm size at the last
employment and the type of the last job inuence insurance coverage. Current job char-
acteristics might inuence health care utilization e.g. through the availability of health
services at the workplace or through required regular health checks. I assume that after
retirement the characteristics of the last job do not have direct e¤ect on health care uti-
lization, ceteris paribus. Similar identication strategy is applied by Jones et al. (2006) and
Paccagnella et al. (2012). It is important that I control for such factors as income, wealth,
and education level in the utilization model, since these inuencing factors of utilization can
also be related to having been employed at a large rm, and to the employment status at
the last job.
Assuming that  and "1 have bivariate normal distribution with zero means and unit
variances, these two binary models form a bivariate probit model. If the exogeneity assump-
tions hold (Z and X are exogenous in models (1) and (2)), the bivariate probit model gives
consistent estimates.
The nonzero numbers of doctoral visits and hospital nights are estimated by zero-truncated
negative binomial regressions. This is the second part of the two-part model. Again, PHI cov-
erage can be endogenous in the utilization models, therefore I apply the method of two-stage
residual inclusion (2SRI): rst I estimate a probit model for the probability of PHI coverage
(model (1)), then include the estimated residual as regressor in the zero-truncated negative
binomial regression. The 2SRI method is an implementation of the method of instrumental
variables in nonlinear models. This approach is widely applied in empirical models in health
economics, for a list of citations see Terza et al. (2008). Provided that there are appropriate
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instruments for the endogenous regressor, the 2SRI method is consistent.5
Without conditioning on positive utilization, the expected value of the outcome is:
E(YjijXi; PHIi; u^i; "2ji) = exp(Xi2j + 2jPHIi + ju^i + "2ji); (3)
where "2 includes unobservables (heterogeneity components), exp("2) has gamma distribu-
tion, and E ("2jijYji > 0; Xi; PHIi; u^i) = 0. u^ is the rst stage residual: u^i = PHIi (Zi^),
where (:) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, and ^ indicates the es-
timated parameter vector of the probit model. If PHI is exogenous in the jth health care
utilization model then j should equal zero. It is assumed in this model that the coe¢ cient
of the rst stage residual is not country specic. This follows from the implicit assumption
that the correlation between the unobservables in the utilization and PHI coverage models
is the same across the countries. Without this assumption separate PHI coverage models
should be estimated for all the analyzed countries, and the problem of small country specic
sample sizes would arise.
The outcome of nal interest is E(YjijXi; PHIi) = Pr(Yji > 0jXi; PHIi)  E(YjijYji >
0; Xi; PHIi). The marginal e¤ect of PHI coverage on the expected utilization can be calcu-
lated using the estimation results of the two parts of the model.
5Alternative consistent estimation methods are the full-information maximum likelihood and two-stage
method of moments estimation suggested by Terza (1998).
Based on Terza et al. (2008), three conditions have to be satised for the consistency of the 2SRI method:
1. The identifying instruments cannot be correlated with the unobservable determinants of health care
utilization. 2. The identifying instruments must be correlated with the PHI variable. 3. The identifying
instruments might not have direct inuence on the utilization measure, and might not be correlated with
the random error term in the utilization model.
These conditions are satised based on the assumptions that the characteristics of the last job have no
direct e¤ect on current helath care utilization, and these characteristics are independent of the unobservable
determinants of utilization.
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5 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the rst wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), release 2.3.1.6 The SHARE data covers individuals aged
50+, and their spouses. Since only the rst wave questionnaire of SHARE contains a question
about PHI coverage, I use only the rst wave, which corresponds to year 2004.
I use samples on 11 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In order to avoid the prob-
lem of small samples, I use pooled data, the size of the estimating sample is 23:5 thousand.
I weight the observations so as each country has the same share in the pooled sample. Each
weight is country specic, and equals the number of all observations divided by the number
of observations in the particular country.
Due to the relatively high rate of nonresponse, for income, wealth, and health insurance
premia I use the imputed values provided in the dataset. The SHARE dataset contains
multiple imputations, I use the average of these.7 The household-level income and wealth
measures are divided by the household size so as to get individual-level measures. I generate
the income measure used in this analysis as the gross income minus the health insurance
payments.8
6This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.3.1, as of July 29th 2010. SHARE data collection in 2004-
2007 was primarily funded by the European Commission through its 5th and 6th framework programmes
(project numbers QLK6-CT-2001- 00360; RII-CT- 2006-062193; CIT5-CT-2005-028857). Additional funding
by the US National Institute on Aging (grant numbers U01 AG09740-13S2; P01 AG005842; P01 AG08291;
P30 AG12815; Y1-AG-4553-01; OGHA 04-064; R21 AG025169) as well as by various national sources is
gratefully acknowledged (see http://www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
7This approach is a simplication, since it neglects the uncertainty of the imputations, therefore can
cause downward bias in the estimated standard errors. However, this simplication does not a¤ect the main
results of the paper.
8Since PHI is predetermined in this model, it is reasonable to subtract its costs from the disposable
income measure. I replace the net income to one for whom its calculated value is zero or negative (there are
63 such observations in the sample used). The median value of annual payments for private health insurance
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Some descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A. The
nancial values are purchasing power parity adjusted. The adjusted values are included in
the SHARE dataset, the adjustment was based on OECD purchasing power parity data. As
health indicators I use the number of chronic diseases the respondents ever had, activities of
daily living (ADL) limitations, and reported symptoms.9
Coverage with supplementary PHI refers by denition only to those individuals who do
not have private insurance as primary health insurance. Having primary private health in-
surance is relevant only in Germany and the Netherlands (the mandatory private insurance
in Switzerland is dened here as public insurance). In the SHARE sample 36% of the indi-
viduals living in the Netherlands report not having basic public health insurance coverage.
These people have private primary coverage. In case of Germany, high-earners, self-employed
people and civil servants might not be covered with the basic public insurance (9% of the
sample). I exclude those individuals from the estimation sample who are covered with pri-
mary private health insurance. The reason for this exclusion is that my aim is to analyze
the di¤erence in utilization between those who are covered with only the mandatory health
insurance, and those who have supplementary PHI coverage as well.
I dene supplementary PHI coverage as having any type of private health insurance which
supplements or complements the basic health insurance. Although there are questions in
contracts is 356 EUR, the mean is 596 EUR among those who report supplementary or complementary PHI
coverage.
9The chronic conditions are: heart attack, high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, stroke, diabetes,
chronic lung disease, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, cancer, stomach ulcer, Parkinson disease, cataracts, hip
or fremoral fracture.
The ADL limitations include di¢ culties with dressing, walking across a room, eating, bathing, getting in
or out of bed, and using the toilet.
The specied symptoms are: pain in a joint, heart trouble, breathlessness, persistent cough, swollen legs,
sleeping problems, falling down, fear of falling down, dizziness, stomach problems, and incontinence.
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the SHARE about the services the PHI provides, I do not use this information because of
the following reasons. First, the denitions of these insurance categories vary across the
country-specic questionnaires. Second, in some insurance categories there are very few
observations. The coverage ratios with the basic ten insurance categories are reported in
Table A.2 in Appendix A. The predominant type of PHI varies across countries, for example
in Austria it is the insurance for hospital care, in the Netherlands the dental care insurance,
whereas in Spain the insurance that provides direct access to specialists.
The dependent variables I analyze in this paper refer to the last 12 months before the
interview. These are the number of times seeing or talking to general practitioners and to
specialists, the number of nights spent in hospital, and reporting visits to dentists. There is
no information in the SHARE data about the number of dental visits. However, I can use
the information if the respondent had any dental visits or not.
When estimating the number of hospital nights or doctoral visits, I exclude those ob-
servations where it is larger than 50. The main reason for this exclusion is theoretical: the
underlying utility maximization model might not be valid for those in the worst health condi-
tion. Reporting high utilization can indicate critical health condition. Cutting the sample at
50 reported hospital nights, GP or specialist visits excludes less than 1% of the observations.
In Table A.3 in Appendix A I present the country-level averages of PHI coverage and
health care utilization. There are large di¤erences in supplementary PHI coverage rates
(ranging from 5  6% in Greece and Italy to 84% in France).10 The cross-country variation
in the ratio of people reporting specialist visits, dental visits, or hospital stays is also not
10The di¤erences between the PHI coverage ratios of Table 1 and of Table A.3 in case of Germany and
the Netherlands are due to the exclusion of those who are not covered by public health insurance.
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negligible, but that is relatively small for GP visits. The majority (85%) of the respondents
report some visits to general practitioners.
The SHARE dataset also provides information on the out-of-pocket expenditures on
health care. The weighted average of annual out-of-pocket expenditure on inpatient services
is 280 EUR for those who report nonzero hospital nights. The average annual outpatient
expenditure is 130 EUR among those who report outpatient visits to GPs, specialists or
dentist. The survey also asks if the respondent had to forego health care due to high costs:
only 4% of the respondents report such di¢ culty, about half of them report that the costs
of dental care were not a¤ordable. These statistics indicate that the out-of-pocket inpatient
and outpatient health expenditures are moderate in the analyzed European countries. Moral
hazard due to PHI coverage is most likely to play a role in dental care utilization. For the
other types of health care the role of PHI is more likely to make higher quality services
available.
6 Estimation results
6.1 Supplementary private health insurance coverage
The estimated coe¢ cients of the probit model of PHI coverage are reported in Appendix B.
Since spouses might make joint decisions on PHI coverage and on health care utilization,
I allow the error terms to be correlated across the household members, and the standard
errors are clustered by household. Income is estimated to have signicantly positive e¤ect
on insurance coverage (the reference country is Austria). The Netherlands is an exception
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in this respect because there the richest individuals are typically covered with primary PHI,
which is not included in the supplementary PHI category. Higher education is also associated
with higher probability of coverage. Most of the country dummy coe¢ cients are signicantly
di¤erent from zero, due to the di¤erences in the health care and insurance institutions across
the countries.
Working for a big rm at the last employment can indicate the availability of group
policies, and accordingly its e¤ect is signicantly positive. Although the estimated likelihood
of PHI does not increase monotonically, the highest rm size implies the highest probability
of coverage, ceteris paribus. As for the type of the last job, self-employment signicantly
increases the probability of being covered with PHI.11
These results suggest that the rm size and employment status indicators might indeed
be used for identifying the e¤ect of PHI coverage on health care utilization. When testing
the joint signicance of these indicators, the p-value of the Wald-test is approximately zero.
6.2 Two-part model coe¢ cient estimates
The preferred specication follows the model described in Section 4.2: the utilization is
modelled as two-stage decision, and supplementary PHI is considered to be endogenous in
both stages.
The rst part of the model is about the probability of utilization and PHI coverage. This
can be estimated for dental care utilization, as well. In Table 2 I present the estimated
coe¢ cients of interest based on the bivariate probit models (equations (1) and (2)), and I
11Based on the estimated marginal e¤ects at the average, the probability of having PHI is 5 percentage
points higher if the rm size is above 500 employees than if the rm size is between 200 499. The increasing
e¤ect of self-employment (compared to private sector employment) at the average is 7 percentage points.
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also report the estimated coe¢ cient of PHI if insurance coverage is assumed to be exogenous
(probit model of equation (2)).12
Table 2: PHI coe¢ cients: probit models of nonzero utilization
Hospital nights GP visits Specialist visits Dental visits
Bivariate Bivariate Bivariate Bivariate
Probit probit Probit probit Probit probit Probit probit
AT 0.191 0.489 0.108 -0.589 0.087 0.101 0.331 0.520
BE 0.120 0.409 0.193 -0.454 0.076 0.095 0.185 0.374
DK -0.045 0.245 0.120 -0.529 0.026 0.044 0.466 0.647
FR 0.083 0.394 0.360 -0.340 0.121 0.142 0.064 0.269
DE 0.175 0.502 -0.097 -0.849 0.151 0.172 0.006 0.209
GR 0.303 0.693 -0.154 -0.989 0.033 0.057 0.150 0.385
IT 0.122 0.496 -0.105 -0.944 -0.125 -0.102 0.121 0.349
NL 0.077 0.365 0.114 -0.535 0.050 0.069 0.474 0.659
ES 0.074 0.423 -0.058 -0.838 0.199 0.220 0.329 0.541
SE -0.108 0.253 -0.090 -0.872 0.018 0.040 0.170 0.390
CH 0.169 0.457 0.020 -0.629 0.306 0.325 0.177 0.358
corr. -0.176 0.393 -0.011 -0.112
, ,  signicant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively
If the endogeneity of PHI is neglected then its e¤ect is underestimated in absolute value
for hospital, GP and dental care utilization. For specialist care utilization the estimated
e¤ects under the simple and bivariate probit models are close to each other. Despite the
di¤erences in the point estimates of the probit and bivariate probit specications, the es-
timated correlation coe¢ cients between the error terms of the PHI and nonzero utilization
models (i.e.  and "1) are insignicant. Thus there is no clear evidence for the endogeneity
of PHI in the rst stage of utilization.13 The results also indicate that coverage with sup-
plementary PHI increases the probability of utilizing hospital care, visiting specialists and
dentists, but decreases the probability of visiting a GP. Most of the estimated coe¢ cients
12The detailed estimation results can be requested from the author.
13I also test the di¤erence between the probit and bivariate probit PHI coe¢ cients using the bootstrap
Hausman test, following Cameron and Trivedi (2009), p. 429-430. The test indicates for all four types of
health care that the estimated PHI coe¢ cients under the two specications do not di¤er signicantly. This
implies that the exogeneity of PHI in the rst stage of utilization cannot be rejected.
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are not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The estimated coe¢ cients of PHI in the second part of the model are presented in Table
3. In this part the amount of utilization is analyzed for those respondents who report nonzero
hospital nights or doctoral visits, and the method of 2SRI is applied. The standard errors
have to be adjusted for two-stage estimation. The results presented in Table 3 are based on
bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. The adjustment of the standard errors
has only small e¤ects.
There is some evidence that PHI is endogenous in the second stage decision on GP care
utilization. The estimated coe¢ cient of the residual from the probit model of PHI coverage
(estimated  from equation (3)) is signicantly positive in this model. The positive coe¢ cient
indicates that the unobservables which increase the probability of PHI coverage also increase
the demand for GP care. On the other hand, the residual is insignicant in the hospital and
specialist care models, thus PHI coverage might be exogenous there.14
The presented results suggest that PHI coverage might increase the probability of hospital
care utilization, but decrease the length of the stay. Being covered with PHI implies lower
probability and signicantly fewer number of visits to GPs. There is some evidence for
increased utilization of specialist care due to supplementary PHI coverage, but this e¤ect is
small and insignicant.
14The estimation results are consistent if the regressors other than PHI, and the characteristics of the
previous job are exogenous. In order to test the validity of the exogeneity assumptions, it is possible to
calculate the nonlinear version of the Sargan test, suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2005), p. 277. The
test fails to reject the exogeneity assumptions.
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Table 3: PHI coe¢ cients: zero-truncated negative binomial models of nonzero utilization
Hosp. nights GP visits Spec. visits
AT -0.500 -1.071 0.424
BE -0.779 -1.256 0.393
DK -0.821 -1.024 0.550
FR -0.537 -1.028 0.283
DE -1.020 -1.312 0.349
GR -0.810 -1.457 0.246
IT -0.091 -1.257 0.478
NL -0.623 -1.198 0.588
ES -1.564 -1.221 0.471
SE -0.939 -1.104 0.408
CH -0.547 -1.209 0.276
First stage residual 0.608 1.155 -0.360
, ,  signicant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively, based on
bootstrapped standard errors
6.3 Analysis of the results
Due to the nonlinear nature of the empirical model, the partial e¤ect of PHI varies among
the individuals. In Table 4 I present the estimated marginal e¤ect of supplementary PHI on
the number of hospital nights and doctoral visits. Using the estimating sample the mode
of the discrete regressors are determined. For the rest of the regressors the mean values are
used, and the marginal e¤ect of the insurance indicator is calculated for this representative
individual.15 The estimates of the total e¤ect are based on the combination of the rst and
second part of the model, as described in Section 4.2 (the total e¤ects are presented under
the columns "Total"). For each service type I also present the estimated marginal e¤ect on
the probability of utilization (columns "Prob.", based on equation (2)), and on the nonzero
number of hospital nights or doctoral visits (columns "Nonzero", based on equation (3)).
Except for Denmark and Sweden, PHI coverage has positive marginal e¤ect on the ex-
15The mfx command of Stata is used when calculating the marginal e¤ects. The signicance levels of
the marginal e¤ects in the two-part models are based on bootstrapped standard errors. The Stata codes of
Deb et al. (2010) are used as basis for the bootstrapping procedures, with 1000 replications.
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pected number of hospital nights. The estimated increase in the overall number of hospital
nights due to PHI coverage is small. The estimated overall positive e¤ects come from the
increasing e¤ect of PHI coverage on the probability of utilization. On the other hand, being
covered with PHI implies shorter stays in hospitals, and this estimated e¤ect is not negligible
in magnitude, although signicantly di¤erent from zero only for Spain. Two explanations
are possible for these ndings. First, PHI coverage might make more e¢ cient or alternative
(home care) services available. Second, it is also likely that individuals with PHI coverage
utilize di¤erent kinds of inpatient services than the uncovered ones. For example, general
health checks induced by PHI coverage might necessitate only short stays in hospitals.
Table 4: Marginal e¤ect of PHI based on the two-part model
Hosp. nights GP visits Spec. visits Dent. visits
Total Prob. Nonzero Total Prob. Nonzero Total Prob. Nonzero Prob.
AT 0.548 0.115 -3.111 -2.938 -0.154 -2.599 0.382 0.026 0.848 0.181
BE 0.225 0.090 -4.420 -3.184 -0.113 -3.052 0.362 0.022 0.818 0.130
DK -0.072 0.050 -4.386 -2.849 -0.140 -2.561 0.494 0.000 1.277 0.220
FR 0.303 0.086 -3.380 -2.771 -0.084 -2.716 0.262 0.039 0.466 0.095
DE 0.390 0.119 -4.954 -3.568 -0.252 -2.873 0.381 0.053 0.702 0.073
GR 0.925 0.181 -4.263 -3.894 -0.309 -2.989 0.159 0.003 0.395 0.134
IT 0.813 0.118 -0.775 -3.737 -0.295 -2.873 0.280 -0.059 1.041 0.125
NL 0.226 0.080 -3.653 -3.100 -0.140 -2.841 0.545 0.013 1.342 0.223
ES 0.104 0.097 -6.065 -3.459 -0.251 -2.756 0.554 0.069 1.066 0.189
SE -0.083 0.053 -4.667 -3.370 -0.263 -2.607 0.316 -0.001 0.825 0.136
CH 0.455 0.106 -3.313 -3.188 -0.170 -2.807 0.440 0.114 0.527 0.125
, ,  signicant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively
(amount of utilization: bootstrapped standard errors)
The estimated marginal e¤ect of supplementary PHI on the expected number of GP visits
is negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero. According to the estimates, PHI has negative
e¤ect both on the probability and number of visits to general practitioners, and the second-
stage e¤ects are signicantly di¤erent from zero. The marginal e¤ect on the probability
of visiting a GP is of considerable magnitude in some of the countries. For instance, PHI
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coverage is estimated to decrease the estimated probability for the representative individual
by around 30 percentage points in Greece and Italy. The negative e¤ect can be the result of
direct access to specialists. Those covered with PHI might also have access to more e¢ cient
treatments and preventive care, which again necessitates fewer GP visits, ceteris paribus.
For specialist care utilization the estimated marginal e¤ect of PHI coverage is less than
one, insignicant, but positive for all countries. The estimated marginal e¤ect on the prob-
ability of visiting a specialist is generally positive, but the maximum is 11 percentage points
and insignicant for all countries. The number of nonzero specialist visits is also estimated
to increase due to PHI coverage, but these results are also insignicant. This nding is
di¤erent from the results of Jones et al. (2006), who estimate signicantly positive e¤ect of
PHI on specialist visits. Although they apply di¤erent methodology to a di¤erent set of
European countries, the most likely explanation for the contrasting ndings lies in the age
structure of the estimating sample. The ndings of Jones et al. (2006) are based on a sample
of individuals aged 16 and above, which suggests that specialist care utilization can be more
responsive to PHI coverage among the younger generations than among the older ones.
Finally, I also analyze the marginal e¤ect of PHI coverage on the probability of dental
care utilization. This e¤ect is positive for all countries. The substantial positive e¤ects in
Denmark and the Netherlands are reasonable, since there the main role of supplementary
PHI is nancing dental care.
The estimated marginal e¤ects can be compared to the ndings of other authors. The rst
stage utilization results are directly comparable to the results reported by Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998),
due to the similar methodology. Based on a U.S. sample they estimate that supplementary
PHI coverage in the U.S. increases the probability of outpatient care utilization by about
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2   7 percentage points, depending on the type of the insurance. Based on my estima-
tion results the marginal e¤ect of supplementary PHI coverage on the probability of doc-
toral care utilization varies across countries and service types. Unanimously positive e¤ect
among the outpatient services is found only for dental care. My estimates indicate that
PHI has smaller e¤ect on outpatient specialist care utilization in Europe than in the U.S.,
but the marginal e¤ect on the probability of visits to dentists is relatively large. Similarly
to my results, negative e¤ect of PHI coverage on visits to general practitioners is found by
Rodríguez and Stoyanova (2004) based on Spanish data. They explain this result by direct
access to specialists due to private insurance. Hullegie and Klein (2010) also estimate nega-
tive e¤ect of private insurance on doctoral visits in Germany, which they explain by receiving
better medical treatment.
How do the estimated e¤ects relate to the country-specic characteristics of the public
health care system? The estimated marginal e¤ect of supplementary PHI on the probability
of hospital stays and dental visits, and on the overall number of hospital nights are positive
for most of the countries. These positive e¤ects are larger in countries where the relative
measures of public health expenditure are smaller, using the aggregate statistics presented
in Table 1. Thus the role of PHI coverage in making inpatient and dental care available is
more important in countries where general government spends relatively less on health care.
The estimated e¤ect of supplementary PHI is also generally positive on the probability and
amount of specialist care utilization. There is some evidence for positive correlation of this
e¤ect with the indicators of public health expenditures, but these relationships are weak.
The estimated e¤ect of supplementary PHI is negative on the probability and amount of
GP care utilization. These negative e¤ects are smaller in absolute value if the public health
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care is more generous. This result suggests that the role of PHI coverage in ensuring direct
access to specialists or higher quality services is less important in countries with larger public
health care systems. In countries where public health expenditures are lower there might be
greater need for avoiding the gatekeeper function of general practitioners.
6.4 Specication checks
In the following, I modify the preferred two-part model, and check how sensitive are the
results to changes in the distributional and exogeneity assumptions. In column (1) under
each service type in Table 5 I repeat the estimated marginal e¤ect of the PHI indicator based
on the second part of the two-part estimation. The results in columns (2)-(4) also refer to
nonzero utilization.
The estimates under column (2) correspond to the case when supplementary PHI is still
assumed to be endogenous, but standard negative binomial model is used in the second
part. Due to the exclusion of zero observations this model is misspecied. However, in case
of GP care the estimated e¤ects are close to the zero-truncated negative binomial (ZTNB)
estimates. For all three types of utilization, neglecting the lack of zero observations shifts
the estimated e¤ects towards zero. The signicance of the estimates is not a¤ected.
Specication (3) is a selection model with endogenous PHI. It is analogous to the two-part
model, but this specication also models the potential correlation between the error terms
of the probit model of utilization and the count data model of nonzero utilization. The
problem with this specication is that there is no sample selection inherent in the health
care utilization model: there are observed zero and nonzero utilizations. The rst part of
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the model is the same as in the two-part model (equations (1) and (2)). I modify equation
(3) the following way:
E

Yjij ~Xi; PHIi; ~"2ji

= exp( ~Xi~2j + ~2jPHIi + ~"2ji) := ji(~"2ji) if Pos_Yji = 1: (4)
I assume that ; "1 and ~"2 have multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and vari-
ance 1; 1; 2, respectively. The main di¤erence from the specication of the two-part model
is that the probability and amount of utilization are estimated jointly, with allowing nonzero
correlation between the error terms "1 and ~"2. The normality assumption simplies the ma-
nipulation of the likelihood function. I also assume that the correlation coe¢ cients between
these error terms are the same across the countries.
The ~X vector of regressors is the same asX in models (2) and (3), except for the exclusion
restrictions, which are needed to strengthen the identication. For inpatient care utilization
the living area is considered as such variable which inuences the probability of hospital
stay, but not the length of the stay. For outpatient care utilization the indicators of the
spouses visit to GP or specialist are excluded from the second stage model. Based on the
distributional assumptions this model can be estimated with maximum simulated likelihood
(MSL). Simulation is needed since there is no closed form of the likelihood function.16
16The contribution of the ith observation with nonzero utilization to the likelihood is
Pr(Yji; Pos_Yji = 1; PHIi = ljXi; Zi) =
=
Z
Pr(Yji; Pos_Yji = 1; PHIi = ljXi; Zi;~"2ji)(~"2ji)d~"2ji =
=
Z
exp( ji(~"2ji))ji(~"2ji)Yji
Yji!
Pr(Pos_Yji = 1; PHIi = ljXi; Zi;~"2ji)(~"2ji)d~"2ji:
(:) is the normal probability density function with mean zero and variance 2, and l equals 0 or 1. The second
term in the last integral can be expressed as a function of ~"2ji, using the rst stage bivariate probit estimation
results, and the assumption of multivariate normality. In order to simplify the estimation procedure, I apply
28
The estimated marginal e¤ects are qualitatively di¤erent from the results of the preferred
two-part model. The di¤erences can be due to the fact that the selectivity model takes into
account that in the second part of the model the sample is not random. However, if the
selection model is reestimated with the assumption that the selectivity is exogenous then
the results still di¤er from the two-part estimation results. These di¤erences can be due to
the di¤erent distributional assumption, and to the exclusion restrictions. Since there are no
strong and theoretically funded exclusion restrictions in the selectivity models, the simpler
two-part model is preferred. Nevertheless, the results still conrm the negative partial e¤ect
of PHI on the number of visits to general practitioners.
As a nal specication check, I compare the estimation results of the zero-truncated
negative binomial models to the case when PHI coverage is assumed to be exogenous in the
second part of the model. Under this specication the residual from the probit model of
PHI coverage is not included in the model of nonzero health care utilization. The estimated
e¤ects of PHI on hospital nights and GP visits are considerably upward biased, compared to
the specication where endogeneity is taken into account (specication (1)). According to
these results it is important to take into account the endogeneity of PHI in the utilization
models. The sensitivity of the results can be explained by the self-selection into PHI coverage.
Due to the inuencing e¤ect of unobserved preferences, those who are covered with PHI are
also more likely to visit general practitioners and to stay longer in hospitals. Therefore
specication (4) underestimates the negative e¤ect of PHI coverage on the number of GP
two-stage maximum likelihood estimation - I estimate the bivariate probit model of equations (1) and (2) in
the rst stage, and use these estimation results as known in the second stage.
In the simulations I use 100 draws from the Halton sequence with prime number 7. For producing the
Halton draws I use the Stata code mdraws written by Cappellari and Jenkins (2006). Cappellari and Jenkins
also discuss the advantages of Halton draws in MSL estimation.
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visits and hospital nights. In case of outpatient specialist care such upward bias cannot be
observed, the association between PHI coverage and the amount of specialist care utilization
is still estimated to be weak.
It follows from this analysis that neglecting the correlation between the unobserved terms
of the utilization and PHI coverage models a¤ects the estimation results. The specication
checks also show that the estimation results are sensitive to the modelling assumptions, in
particular to the distributional assumptions, and to the choice between two-part models
and selection models. Due to identication problems inherent in the selectivity model, the
two-part model is preferred here.
7 Conclusions
Assuming that individuals behave in utility maximizing way, health insurance coverage
should inuence health care utilization decisions. It depends not only on the individual
characteristics, but also on the country specic institutional backgrounds to what extent
supplementary private health insurance coverage inuences the utilization of health care.
In this paper I analyze the e¤ect of supplementary PHI coverage on the utilization of
hospital, general practitioner, specialist and dental care among people aged 50 and above
in Europe. I model health care utilization as a two-stage decision. Due to the e¤ects
of unobservables, insurance coverage is likely to be endogenous in health care utilization
models. I identify its e¤ects using the characteristics of the last job. The estimated e¤ects
are compared across various modelling assumptions. The size, and in some cases also the
sign of the estimated e¤ects vary with the assumptions. The specication tests show that the
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exogeneity assumptions about supplementary PHI have substantial e¤ect on the estimated
coe¢ cients.
I compare the e¤ects of supplementary PHI among 11 European countries. According
to the results of the preferred two-part specication, PHI coverage increases hospital, out-
patient specialist and dental care utilization, but has a negative e¤ect on visits to general
practitioners. The e¤ects on the expected number of hospital nights and visits to specialists
are insignicant and close to zero. Both the positive e¤ects on hospital and dental care uti-
lization, and the negative e¤ects on general practitioner care utilization are larger in absolute
value in countries where public health care funding is less generous.
The empirical results indicate that although there is almost universal coverage with public
health insurance in the analyzed European countries, the role of supplementary private health
insurance is not negligible among individuals aged 50 and over. There is evidence that
the main roles of private insurance are making dental services available, and avoiding the
otherwise compulsory visits to general practitioners when making contacts with specialists.
The results presented in the paper can be informative for health policy decisions. Supporting
private health insurance coverage might increase the utilization of some types of health
services, especially of dental care, and direct the demand towards more e¢ cient service
types.
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Appendix
A Descriptive statistics
A.1 Sample mean and standard deviation of the variables
mean sd mean sd
age 64.96 10.19 smoking habits
female 0.55 0.50 never 0.53 0.50
marital status stopped 0.27 0.44
with spouse 0.68 0.47 smoking 0.20 0.40
with partner 0.04 0.20 last job
single 0.28 0.45 civil servant 0.10 0.29
has children 0.88 0.32 public employee 0.17 0.38
income (1000 EUR) 20.98 74.19 self-employed 0.17 0.37
main residence (1000 EUR) 102.51 321.00 supplementary PHI 0.32 0.47
education level # illness 1.35 1.38
primary 0.35 0.48 # ADL problems 0.20 0.76
lower secondary 0.18 0.39 # symptoms 1.45 1.62
upper secondary 0.31 0.46 rm size not relevant 0.26 0.44
tertiary 0.16 0.37 rm size 1-5 0.13 0.34
living area rm size 6-15 0.14 0.34
big city 0.14 0.35 rm size 16-24 0.08 0.26
suburbs big city 0.16 0.37 rm size 25-199 0.23 0.42
large town 0.19 0.39 rm size 200-499 0.07 0.25
small town 0.26 0.44 rm size 500- 0.10 0.29
rural 0.25 0.43 # gp visits 4.89 7.64
employment status # hosp.nights 1.55 7.13
retired 0.50 0.50 # specialist visits 1.57 4.56
employed, other 0.12 0.33 visit dentist 0.54 0.50
unemployed 0.03 0.17
disabled 0.03 0.17
homemaker 0.15 0.35
civil servant 0.04 0.19
self-employed 0.07 0.26
public employee 0.07 0.25
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A.2 Percentage of individuals covered by specic types of supple-
mentary PHI
AU BE DK FR DE GR IT NL ES SE CH
medical care with
direct access to specialists 2.7 6.4 9.2 70.0 3.8 1.8 1.8 0.0 6.0 1.4 17.8
medical care with an
extended choice of doctors 2.6 0.2 4.9 52.0 3.5 1.3 0.7 0.0 4.3 0.5 18.5
dental care 1.5 5.7 18.6 75.9 5.6 0.4 0.4 47.0 3.2 0.2 6.4
larger choice of drugs
and/or full drugs expenses 1.6 2.7 13.8 72.1 0.7 0.6 0.4 34.7 0.9 0.4 14.2
extended choice of hospitals 16.5 0.1 5.3 73.7 4.2 1.5 1.7 0.0 4.3 0.5 38.2
long term care 0.8 0.2 0.5 64.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 9.2
nursing care at home 0.9 0.1 0.8 54.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 2.3 0.0 8.8
home help for ADL 0.7 2.7 0.3 25.8 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 8.3
full coverage of costs for doctor visits 2.1 0.8 2.0 49.7 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 4.1 1.2 1.7
full coverage of costs for hospital care 6.7 59.5 1.8 12.8 5.3 2.1 1.1 0.0 3.8 0.9 5.0
A.3 Supplementary private health insurance coverage and health
care utilization - sample means
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Supplementary # hospital # GP # specialist
PHI Hospital Visit Visit Visit nights visits visits
coverage stay GP specialist dentist (if hosp.>0) (if GP>0) (if spec.>0)
AT 0.23 0.19 0.85 0.37 0.51 11.57 5.51 3.58
BE 0.76 0.14 0.92 0.48 0.49 9.35 6.17 3.77
DK 0.36 0.12 0.81 0.18 0.76 8.58 4.01 3.78
FR 0.84 0.15 0.93 0.46 0.44 8.92 5.75 3.63
DE 0.14 0.16 0.92 0.54 0.75 12.35 5.54 4.29
GR 0.05 0.08 0.76 0.27 0.37 8.22 5.43 4.63
IT 0.06 0.12 0.83 0.41 0.33 9.76 7.70 4.02
NL 0.72 0.11 0.80 0.40 0.57 7.50 3.71 4.18
ES 0.09 0.11 0.88 0.42 0.26 9.13 7.72 4.40
SE 0.09 0.11 0.75 0.28 0.78 6.66 2.70 3.07
CH 0.33 0.12 0.83 0.30 0.68 8.93 4.13 3.86
 Hospital nights or doctoral visits above 50 are excluded.
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B Estimated coe¢ cients of the probit model of sup-
plementary private health insurance coverage
PHI PHI
age -0.009 last job
female 0.077 civil servant 0.028
marital status self-employed 0.204
with partner 0.074 public employee -0.03
single -0.118 living area
log income 0.093 suburbs big city -0.054
log income: DE 0.153 large town -0.065
log income: SE 0.061 small town -0.152
log income: NL -0.121 rural -0.230
log income: ES 0.046 rm size 1-5 0.183
log income: IT 0.106 rm size 6-15 0.164
log income: FR -0.087 rm size 16-24 0.077
log income: DK 0.098 rm size 25-199 0.170
log income: GR 0.010 rm size 200-499 0.146
log income: CH -0.106 rm size 500- 0.268
log income: BE -0.010 country: DE -2.045
log home 0.010 country: SE -1.201
log home: DE 0.020 country: NL 2.626
log home: SE -0.003 country: ES -0.819
log home: NL -0.005 country: IT -1.513
log home: ES 0.001 country: FR 2.674
log home: IT -0.014 country: DK -0.747
log home: FR 0.004 country: GR -0.644
log home: DK 0.011 country: CH 1.431
log home: GR -0.028 country: BE 1.667
log home: CH -0.001 Constant -1.554
log home: BE -0.002 Observations 23,503
education level
lower secondary 0.136
upper secondary 0.360
tertiary 0.485
, ,  signicant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively
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